This paper discusses and analyses the current evolution of the exceptional employment law rules governing (certain) public sector employment and the implication of that evolution for access to justice for public employees. It starts with an analysis of the origins and justifications for the separation of the regulation of 'private' as opposed to 'public employees, and how that separation has evolved over time. The article then proceeds to outline some of the possible critiques of that separation, and the potential for the challenge to that separation in theoretical terms. In the third section, there is an assessment of the practical ways in which way public employees have recently sought to challenge this separation, and particularly their exclusion from private employment law rights. It discusses the reasons for the varying degrees of success of that challenge. The final section proceeds to discuss how far public law may step in to counteract the exclusion of public employees from the employment law regime. In particular there is a discussion of the realisation within the public law arena of a need to relax the strict separation of the public/private regime and the need to cater for particular individual circumstances.
Introduction
In the UK, the judicial system is founded on a separation between private law on the one hand and public law on the other. 1 In general terms, employment law sits uneasily on that public/private 1 Indeed this separation is pervasive throughout the liberal democratic world. For an interesting discussion of the possible benefits to employees of a relaxation of that regime to cater for particular individual circumstances.
Justifications for differential treatment of private sector/public sector employees
At a theoretical level, the justification for the differential treatment of employees in the public and private sector can stem from the recognition of the important differences in public as opposed to private power. 7 Private power may be characterised as 'economic' in nature. At the level of 5 For example, on a national level, prison officers who were once excluded from the majority of employment law rights are now largely included within this regime. However, they remain excluded from the right to take part in industrial action as a result of a statutory duty established in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. At EU level, in a series of cases at the European Court of Human Rights, employees have successfully challenged their exclusion from employment rights on the basis that the exclusion constitutes a breach of their rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial). However, their inclusion only extends to those rights 'within the scope of EU law', and therefore does not include unfair dismissal protection for example (see section 4 for further discussion on this point). 6 For example, domestic workers employed by diplomatic staff (see section 4 for further discussion). 7 A C L Davies, 'Ultra Vires Problems in Government Contracts ' (2006) Law Quarterly Review 98, 99 recruitment of public sector staff should be more highly regulated than in the private sector to ensure the requisite level of (public) openness and transparency.
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A further justification for the distinction between the regulation of public and private sector employment is the idea of contractual status. Whilst the contract of employment forms the basis of both common law and statutory regulation of the private employment relationship, there are difficulties with the concept of a contract of employment to describe relationships between the state and its employees. Indeed, certain public sector groups have been designated 'officeholders' rather than contractual employees. For these purposes, an 'office' is a position of a public nature which has an existence irrespective of the person who fills it, and which is filled by successive holders. 12 The duties of an office are defined not by agreement but by law or by relevant statutory rules. Traditionally, the status of 'officeholder' conferred a number of advantages on public servants.
For example, officeholders could only be dismissed for good cause, rather than for any reason or by proper notice as used to be the position at common law. 13 Officeholders also potentially had access to administrative law rules, including for example the right to claim judicial review. These features led some authors to suggest that employment law could be separated into a coherent 'law of public employment' governed by public law rules, and a contrasting law of private employment which presented a 'contractual approach to the regulation of employment relationships'. 14 For example, Freedland suggested that the 'contractual approach' to regulation concentrated on the 'substantive and specific aspects of the relationship' whereas the 'public law status approach' envisaged the office-holder as bound by more 'diffuse' procedural obligations. On the one hand the office-holder 11 G S Morris, 'Employment in Public Services: The Case for Special Treatment ' (2000) ' (1991) 20 ILJ 72, 72 was bound by the 'dictates of commitment' whereas the employer must proceed according to notions of 'fairness'. 15 The importance of the officeholder/contractual distinction has waned over time, with many officeholders now able to claim dual officeholder/employee status for the purposes of accessing statutory employment law rights. 16 However, the availability of public law remedies to public sector employees continues to be of relevance, and the contractual/non-contractual distinction is central to its determination. Administrative law remedies only exist for public sector employees where the dispute lies outside the scope of 'private' contractual rights. Indeed, the existence of a 'contract of employment' has been put forward as grounds for refusing access to judicial review. 17 In order to rebut the presumption that the employment relationship is within the private realm, there need to be exceptional circumstances of 'publicness'. For example, a specific aspect of the employment relationship must be underpinned by statute or determined by prerogative, or the relationship must have a particular public quality. 18 Furthermore, judicial review may be denied if the subject of the employment dispute falls outside the public duty owed to the employee. For example, judicial review was denied to a detective inspector of police who challenged a decision to send him back to his local force from his seconded position at the National Crime Squad. This decision was deemed to be of an operational nature, and therefore not part of the public function of the police force.
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The final justificatory distinction between regulation in the public and private sector looks to the particular function which (certain) public sector employees perform. raised by public servants whose duties are 'designed to safeguard the general interests of the State' then they will be excluded from the scope of Article 6 ECHR. 33 In Pellegrin v France, it was asserted that 'manifest' examples of these activities are provided by the armed forces and the police. 34 As a result, it has been held that these groups will not benefit from Article 6 protection. In the previous section, the different justificatory arguments for the separation of public employment from employment in the private sector were raised. There was also a discussion of the application of those different justificatory arguments to different public sector groups. It is clear from this discussion that instead of sitting neatly on either side of the public/private divide, different groups tend to straddle it, achieving employment law protection in some areas and not in others.
The aims of this section is to delve a little more deeply into the justificatory arguments surrounding the public/private divide and reveal the possible problems in applying these arguments to the real world. Section 4 builds on these arguments by discussing how certain groups have attempted to challenge the public/private divide, and particularly the arguments used by those workers seeking inclusion within the statutory scheme of employment rights protection. The final section will discuss the varying degrees of success of those attempts and any possible alternatives for excluded public sector groups.
The first major problem with the justificatory arguments concerning the public/private divide, is the assumption that they work in tandem to produce a clear outcome. The argument proceeds that a private relationship will be contractual and involve private power and private functions, whereas a public relationship will involve the exercise of public functions and will not be non-contractual in nature. This division is very difficult to sustain in practice. Very often public sector workers will be employed both under a contract purporting to determine the boundaries of the relationship, and under a statutory framework which controls the functions of the public body and its powers. in practice many functions are delegated to the relevant school's governing body. 37 In any event, the Secretary of State retains the power to make provision for the determination of the pay of school teachers, and any other conditions of employment which relate to their professional duties or working time. 38 Therefore, whilst school teachers are deemed to have 'contracts of employment' as a matter of law, those contracts are not solely circumscribed by private power, but also by public power.
It may be argued that in practical terms, the 'public' features of these employment contracts do not affect the overall rights of these employees, as these rights are determined through (private) employment law. However, in some situations, this public/private division can be manipulated so that public sector workers fall outside the boundaries of both private law and public law. Civil servants provide a good example. Traditionally, it was held that civil servants could not have a contract of employment. Their employer was the Crown, and the Crown could not fetter its discretion by binding itself to contracts of employment. 39 In terms of private law, the contractual status of civil servants remains uncertain. Although civil servants are assumed to have contracts of employment for the purposes of statutory protection, their contracts remain theoretically subject to common law rules which are inconsistent with the general common law rules determining contracts of employment. It therefore appears that civil servants may face problems in claiming under (certain of) the common law rules relating to contracts of employment (such as rules which seek to limit the 37 Education Act 2002, s 35. In fact, with increasing fragmentation in the provision of public sector education, governing bodies have gained more and more power. In the case of free schools and academies, the governing body now acts as the employer of the school's staff (rather than the local education authority), as well as having other admissions responsibilities and the ability to own school land. For more detail on the functions of governing bodies across the range of school types see Department for Education, 'Governor' for other groups has been more fragmented, and certainly police officers and army personnel remain excluded from most employment protection legislation. The following section discusses more recent challenges to the scope of employment protection legislation by public sector groups, and the continued difficulties many groups face in achieving access to employment protection rights.
It appears that despite dubious theoretical grounding, some groups remain excluded from protection in employment law, whilst even the most 'successful' groups face have not achieved access to the whole range of employment rights.
The Challenge to Statutory exclusion
The argued that above all else he was an employee of the Defendant Council and therefore should have the normal right to claim unfair dismissal.
The Court of Appeal accepted that all thirteen members of the Redbridge Parks Service were employees of the Defendant Council. They were issued with job descriptions by the Council which set out their roles and they were subject to the Council's disciplinary rules and procedures. However, the Court of Appeal also accepted the 'special status' of those employees as constables appointed pursuant to the relevant statutory powers. 45 That special status meant that they were required to make a declaration before a justice of peace as to their public service, and also that they were invested with certain 'public' powers such as the power of arrest. That special status also meant that they were excluded from the Employment Rights Act 1996 by virtue of both sections 200 (2) Police. In contrast to the position for regular police officers therefore, the public law remedies did not compensate for the lack of private law protection. Finally, the Court raised the difficulties in 45 The relevant law appears in section 77 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Acts 1907, which gives local authorities the powers to appoint officers to be sworn in as constables for the purposes of maintaining public health, and article 18 of the London Parks Order provided in could have relied on their immunity to avoid the proceedings. The act complained of (closure of the army base) was an act jure imperii and so outside the jurisdiction of the Courts. Implicit in these findings was that the sovereign nature of the Defendant's act outweighed any access to justice claim, and the functional distinction between the civilian nature of the Claimant's activities and those of other army personnel made no difference to the outcome.
A third point to make is that the courts have recently approached the balancing exercise under Article 6 quite differently in relation to diplomatic (as opposed to state) immunity, with a negative outcome for public sector employees seeking to enforce private rights. Diplomatic immunity in this context refers to the immunity of members of diplomatic staff as against claims by their personal 60 This jurisprudence provides that in relation to the applicability of Article 6 to public servants, there should not be blanket exclusion from rights. A functional approach should be adopted which assesses the nature of the employee's duties and responsibilities. Where those duties typify the specific activities of the public service then the employee will be excluded from scope of Article 6. Where an employee's post does not involve participation in the exercise of public power they will not be excluded. appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision on the basis that a lack of financial rigour did not make the decision Wednesbury unreasonable (irrational) and that the considerations (length of service, costs in defending an unfair dismissal claim) were not legally irrelevant. The Trust was therefore duty bound to pay the Claimant the relevant sum under the compromise agreement.
The second ground of judicial review is potentially of more assistance to public employees seeking to claim judicial review. It implies that public decisions are subject to the Wednesbury test:
decisions will be unlawful if they are 'so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come (discussed in more detail below). In that case it was consistently pointed out by the Court that any claim of irrationality did not allow it to interfere in the Army board's decision. For example, in relation to the Claimant's drunken behaviour as a factor in the dismissal, the Court stated (at para 68) that 'it was a matter which the Army Board itself could properly take into account. Doing so was not contrary to the earlier decision. Doing so did not make the decision irrational'. found that the standard was 'whether the decision on finding or outcome was within the range of reasonable findings or outcomes to which the Panel could have arrived'. 81 The similarity of this test to that adopted in private dismissals is striking.
The Derbyshire case also considered claims under the third ground of judicial review. The third ground relates to claims of natural justice, which require both that the individual concerned is given adequate notice of the charge and an adequate hearing, and also that there is no bias on the part of the adjudicator. 82 In Derbyshire, the police officers claimed that they had not been given adequate notice of the claims against them. In particular they took issue with the fact that the Misconduct Panel which finally decided their fate referred to breaches of standards of professional behaviour which were not detailed in the initial notices of misconduct served upon them. 'Where a case is referred to misconduct proceedings, the appropriate authority shall as soon as practicable given the officer concerned (a) written notice of (i) the referral (ii) the conduct that is the subject matter of the case and how that conduct is alleged to amount to misconduct or gross misconduct as the case may be'. 84 Crosbie (n 75) opportunity to comment on it. However, the Court held that, although bias was a potential ground for review, the requirements of natural justice had been met by his opportunity to raise these complaints at the Army Board, and that the Board had not erred in law in rejecting his Commission.
The above discussion presents a very mixed picture. On the one hand, it appears that public law claims can ensure that procedural safeguards are maintained in relation to the adjudication of employment disputes. On the other hand, the traditional standards of review under public law traditionally provide only a minimum benchmark, considerably below the standards required under (private) employment law. Furthermore, that standard is procedural rather than substantive in nature. Perhaps the best outcome for public employees has arisen when the courts have been willing to adjust the public law standards to the particular context by for example, the construction of 'Wednesbury-type test' which allows the court to assess the range of reasonable responses required by a public body. This approach moves the standard closer to that required in private law, and is perhaps a recognition of the artificiality of the distinction between public standards as applied to public employees and private standards applied to private employees. It is an approach which not only offers a greater possibility of access to justice for public employees, but makes more sense in theoretical terms: both public and private actions can amount to an abuse of power against which individuals must be protected. Access to justice for public sector employees is both fragmented and partial. Some public sector groups have access to the majority of private law rights. Other public sector groups are largely excluded from the private law regime. As far as public law is concerned, there are also considerable discrepancies between those public sector employees who are able to claim judicial review and those who are not. The reasons for this fragmented picture are at once historical, theoretical and practical. Historically speaking, the starting point for the formation of the employment law regime in the UK was the Diceyan understanding that, in principle everyone should be equal before the law. As a result there was no special public law regime for public sector employees. At the same time, certain groups were excluded from the private regime on the basis of their functional requirements, and the particular public law rules which concerned the abuse of power by public sector employees continued to apply. From the very start then, there was a fragmented picture in terms of access to justice for public sector employees. However, this fragmented picture was not simply a quirk of history. It has persisted and even intensified over time. One possible explanation for this pattern is the difficulty in the theoretical separations which underpin the public/private divide. Dichotomies such as public versus private power, contractual versus non-contractual status are very difficult to sustain in practice. The 'functional' distinction between public and private employees is also difficult to sustain in light of the privatisation of many previously public functions, and the move towards more and more complicated public/private partnerships.
The weaknesses of the theoretical underpinnings of the public private divide are well demonstrated by recent legal challenges to the employment law exclusions as a matter of private law. The 'non contractual' exclusion has been successfully challenged by 'office-holders' such as local council Registrars, on the basis that the 'office-holder' label should not denote a lesser contractual status for Registrars compared to other council employees. The functional exclusion has been challenged by council employed 'constables' who are excluded from (unfair dismissal) protection as a result of their 'special status'. This functional exclusion was found inconsistent with the treatment of other similar groups (for example prison officers), but the challenge was ultimately unsuccessful (it required Parliamentary intervention). Finally, the distinction between public and private power as the basis for the exclusion of public sector employees from employment rights has also been subject to challenge. For example, the employees of UK based state embassies have successfully challenged their inability to bring employment law claims as a result of the operation of the doctrine of state immunity. They have argued that by entering into contracts of employment with civilian staff, a state is exercising powers which are private rather than public. As a result these rights can be 'balanced'
with an employee's individual right to a fair trial under the ECHR, and where the functions of the employee do not interfere with the exercise of sovereign power, the individual's rights should prevail.
Despite the successful (theoretical) challenge to the public/private divide by some public sector employees, it appears that certain public sector groups are likely to remain excluded from (the majority of) private law rights. For these groups, it may be argued that the greatest potential lies in the recognition within the public law regime of the particular private context. On occasion, this recognition has allowed a relaxation of certain strict public law rules, and has even brought certain of those rules more in line with the standards of private law. This approach is valuable because it recognises that in reality the separation of public from private standards rests on rather shaky theoretical ground. The approach opens up the possibility of thinking about the divide in a more pragmatic way and according to what justice demands. It suggests that, at base, the law of employment is united by just one principle: that abuse of power is not to be tolerated. That principle applies in different ways in different situations, but that application is simply a recognition of the particular priority given to employee freedom in any particular context.
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